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ROUND TABLE

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Labor Policies in Wartime

- LESCOHIER
- STONE
- YNTEMA

416th BROADCAST IN COOPERATION WITH THE NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY • 204

FEBRUARY 8, 1942

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

ROUND TABLE

REG. U.S. PAT. OFF.

Published weekly. 10 cents a copy; five copies, 25 cents; full-year subscription, 52 issues, two dollars. Published by the University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois. Entered as second-class matter January 3, 1939, at the post office at Chicago, Illinois, under the Act of March 3, 1879.

No. 204

NOTE

The supplementary information contained in the footnotes to the fo lowing text, developed by staff research, is not to be considered as repr senting the opinions of the ROUND TABLE *speakers. Following th transcript of the broadcast are questions which readers may wish to u for analysis and discussion. It is hoped that teachers and discussio leaders may find this additional service of the* ROUND TABLE *transcri helpful in their study of the subject discussed in the broadcast.*

LABOR POLICIES IN WARTIME

A UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE BROADCAST*

DON D. LESCOHIER, Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin

RALEIGH W. STONE, Associate Professor of Industrial Relations, University of Chicago

T. O. YNTEMA, Professor of Statistics, School of Business, University of Chicago

* A radio discussion broadcast from the University of Chicago over the Red Network of the National Broadcasting Company, Sunday, February 8, 1942, at 1:30 P.M., Central Standard Time.

The ROUND TABLE, oldest educational program continuously on the air, is broadcast entirely without a script, although participants meet in advance, prepare a topical outline, and exchange data and views. Subjects are chosen because of their social, political, or economic significance. The program has no "ax to grind." In the selection of speakers, the effort is to provide a balanced discussion by participants who have special competence and knowledge. The opinion of each speaker is his own and in no way involves the responsibility of either the University of Chicago or the National Broadcasting Company.

LABOR POLICIES IN WARTIME

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A nation must organize every element of its complex structure if it is to win a war quickly and efficiently. Basic policies must be determined for this organization and applied to each new problem as it arises. Of primary importance to the war effort is the effective use of manpower—and sound labor policy is a prerequisite of efficient production of war materials.

Is labor justified in seeking to improve its position in a time of emergency? Must labor accept a declining standard of living while other elements in the economy profit from the war effort? Should labor be given a more prominent role in the councils of war-production management?

To answer these and other questions of immediate interest and importance to every citizen, the University of Chicago ROUND TABLE *invited three expert observers to its microphone to discuss: "Labor Policies in Wartime."*

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MR. YNTEMA: In general, the public is becoming critical of labor's behavior in the defense and war effort. It has been critical of labor's efforts to get higher wages and to get an extension of the closed shop; it is critical of strikes by labor, which interfere with the defense effort.

MR. STONE: That's right. That fact has been clearly disclosed in recent polls of public opinion. The public is quite exercised about the role of labor.

But, on the whole, I think the public shows rather gross misinformation on this subject. It is rather hopelessly ignorant about the specific issues that are involved and what can be done about them.[1]

MR. LESCOHIER: Many of the issues involved are of such an intricate character that the public can't understand them, and many of the terms that are used and the issues that stand out in industry are simply not understood by the public.

MR. STONE: That is one of the reasons why it is worth while to give this subject careful consideration and why we should look into the question of what labor policies in wartime should be.

MR. YNTEMA: In your opinion what are the problems with which we are confronted in establishing a proper method of dealing with this labor situation?

MR. STONE: We are concerned with the issue of wages. Wages represent an enormous part of the national expenditure. They have an important relationship to ourselves, and, of course, they affect people's way of life. The problem of wages is an intricate issue.

MR. YNTEMA: Right! What other policies are there?

MR. STONE: There is the question of hours of work and particularly the relation of hours of work to overtime as well as to the question of effective production.

MR. YNTEMA: Would you add the question of the closed shop?

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[1] *After a comprehensive survey of public opinion and information on labor problems and policies, the "Fortune" survey concludes: "About two-thirds of the public is wholly unequipped to have any opinions about labor problems, and only about a quarter really know enough to be intelligent on the subject. That finding alone is a fact of tremendous importance in a democracy that has recently been seriously disturbed by labor conflicts, and that eventually will have to face labor problems again, even if a truce is declared for the duration of the war" ("Fortune," February, 1942).*

MR. STONE: Yes, of course. In the past few years that has been a very important issue.

MR. YNTEMA: And strikes?

MR. STONE: Along with it. I'd say the closed shop is a part of the program of extending union organization and increasing its influence and participation in public affairs.

MR. YNTEMA: Lescohier, you would say, wouldn't you, that strikes also constitute a real problem?

MR. LESCOHIER: The public is justified in being exercised about the number of strikes we've had in this country. In 1941 there were twice as many strikes in the United States in proportion to the population as in England. There were one and a half times as many as in Canada. We had over four thousand strikes last year.[2]

MR. STONE: That is a rather serious situation, and, as we find this war effort pressing harder and harder, we might look forward, if we don't have a workable labor policy, to more strikes. That is an important issue. It involves getting at the problems in such a way as to avoid strikes.

MR. YNTEMA: I'd like to add one more to the list of issues, and that is: What about labor's participation in the management of the war effort?

MR. STONE: I think that is going to become one of the critical issues. Labor has been interested in expanding its power and authority and participation in affairs.

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[2] *An estimated 4,500 strikes, involving 2,400,000 workmen and 23,500,000 man-days of idleness, occurred in 1941. The "United States News" reports that this constitutes an 80 per cent increase in strike activity over 1940; that it means 1 worker out of every 12 employed in the country was on strike at some time during the year; and that the average striker lost almost 10 days of work.*

DEFENSE STRIKES

Distinguishing between Strikes "of Significance to Defense" and Strikes in Plants Working on Defense Orders,* the OPM Issued the Following Report on Man-Days Lost during the Period June, 1940, to October 11, 1941



MR. LESCOHIER: You can't get cooperation from a great mass of people, like the wage-earners of the country, in a democratic society without having them participate in setting up policies and controls.

MR. YNTEMA: We've got five problems, then: First of all, wage policy; second, policy with respect to hours of work; third, the closed shop; fourth, strikes; and, fifth, labor's participation in the management of the war program.

** The OPM explained that "strikes of significance" were strikes actually affecting the flow of necessary war materials as distinguished from a strike, say, in a factory making pillows for the army which could be obtained elsewhere or done without.*

MR. STONE: That's right. Now in an all-over way I would support Lescohier. We've got to handle these things in such fashion as to get the work done expeditiously and to preserve as much justice as we can in doing this work; that is, to avoid as little injustice as we can and get cooperation.

MR. YNTEMA: Let's get down to cases. Let's take the first problem: wage policy. What would be your idea as to the proper criteria for wage policy in wartime?

MR. STONE: It seems to me that if we are going to get at that question, we should try to state it in terms of objectives.

One of the important objectives should be this: We should attempt to avoid, in so far as we can, the possible effect of rising wages bringing about a skyrocketing of prices. That is, we should be worried about inflation. Our wage policy should attempt to avoid that.[3]

That is one of the major issues, but I would also say we ought to try to preserve as much justice as we can and handle our wages in such a fashion that we distribute a limited amount of goods and services as fairly as possible among the people of the nation.

MR. LESCOHIER: That's so abstract, so idealistic! Don't we have to get down to the real facts of the wage situation if we are going to get anywhere?

MR. YNTEMA: Well, what are the facts?

MR. LESCOHIER: Fundamentally, the wage-earners of this country have been trying, since 1914, to get a distinctly higher standard of living. They say, "Businessmen are rising to higher standards of living; farmers are rising to higher standards; so are lawyers and doctors—why not us?"

MR. STONE: That may have been a proper position to take up to

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[3] *See John M. Clark, Theodore O. Yntema, and the Roving Reporter, "How To Meet the Menace of Inflation," a University of Chicago* ROUND TABLE *transcript, No. 200, January 11, 1942.*

DEFENSE STRIKES*

OPM Data on Significant Strikes, June, 1940—October 11, 1941



a few months ago, but that era is over. Now is the time that calls for sacrifice. We haven't got an expanding economy now so far as goods and services are concerned. The standards of living cannot rise.

MR. YNTEMA: That's right. In the past year and a half I'd say that labor did right well for itself compared with the other elements in the economy.

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* *Data on strikes of all kinds during the first eight months of 1941 are given in the pictograph on page 13.*

MR. LESCOHIER: But labor thinks that the businessmen and the farmers have done right well by themselves too.

MR. YNTEMA: There are other groups besides the businessmen and the farmers that go to make up this country. Not *all* labor groups—but the average—have done better than the average of all other people in the country.

MR. STONE: Let us satisfy Lescohier right away by admitting what he has to say. Surely the farmers have done quite well by themselves.

MR. YNTEMA: That's right.

MR. STONE: And businessmen generally have done pretty well.

MR. YNTEMA: Some businessmen.

MR. STONE: But we are not talking of the whole economy; we are talking about labor policy. Could we restrict it to that, assuming that what we say for labor policy should apply in general terms to everybody else?

MR. LESCOHIER: I want to go back to what Yntema said a moment ago. He said "some businessmen" have done well by themselves, and he implied that all laboring men have. That isn't true.

MR. YNTEMA: I didn't mean to imply that. I would agree with you that there are many labor groups who are worse off than they were a year or two years ago.

MR. LESCOHIER: There are many more that are worse off than people realize.

MR. YNTEMA: I'd like to make this point: We are in a very different situation now from what we were a year ago or six months ago. In the past year and a half we have had more guns, but we have had more butter because we have been drawing more people into production. But now we are getting tight on the availability

of resources—labor and capital resources—for further production, and the situation is different.

MR. LESCOHIER: So what? What do you mean?

MR. YNTEMA: I mean, if we are going to have an expansion of our military program, so that instead of a quarter now let's say it takes a half of all the goods and services in the country, that inevitably there is not going to be more butter. It means that perhaps by the end of this year there is going to be a 25 per cent reduction in the goods and services which civilians can buy. There are going to be more people at work and there is going to be less per person.

MR. LESCOHIER: You're right. The situation is changing. From 1939 to December 7, 1941, the government was luring us into the defense program by suggesting that businessmen could make more money; farmers could make more money; wage-earners could make higher wages; everybody could profit. Now we have come face to face with the fact that we can't profit—none of us. We've got to take sacrifices, and they must be substantial ones.

MR. STONE: Then we are up against the proposition that from now on wages cannot rise so rapidly as cost of living increases—or, rather, from now on real wages cannot continue to increase. The standard of living cannot rise in the face of a decreasing production available for civilian consumption.

MR. YNTEMA: I'd put it more strongly than that. I'd say not only *cannot* rise but that, unless labor is going to maintain its position at the expense of other groups in the economy, the standard of living of the laboring man must go down as this war effort expands.

MR. LESCOHIER: How can you stop wages from rising?

MR. YNTEMA: If I may paraphrase T. V. Smith's famous remark, I'm only an ignorant man and an economist, and I'm not a labor economist. I'd like to throw that question back in your own face.

Mr. Lescohier: Since the fall of 1939 average wages in this country have risen substantially. The average weekly earnings, in terms of purchasing power, of American factory workers have increased 21 per cent since September, 1939. A continuation of that rise in real wages is impossible. You're right, if prices are stabilized, if profits are held down, and if the farm group is prevented from getting high farm prices, labor will be willing to stabilize wages; but if the other groups get the gravy, labor is not going to be willing to sit back.

Mr. Yntema: I agree with you entirely on that. I'd like to put a specific question to you: What do you think about the immediate proposals of the A.F. of L. and the C.I.O. with respect to higher wages to take care of higher taxes on the laboring man and the increased cost of living?

Mr. Lescohier: I think the principle laid down by A.F. of L. and C.I.O. leaders that wages should be increased in 1942 enough so that wages will keep up with the cost of living and so wage-earners will also get enough extra wages to pay their war taxes is an indefensible proposition. It amounts to asking that the taxes labor must pay be shifted over to the rest of the community or to the government's debt.

Mr. Stone: I agree with that, and I'd like to pose a question to Yntema: How much could money wages rise without exercising a significant influence on prices? That is, without producing a price spiral upward.

Mr. Yntema: I would say that any further general increase in wage rates is going to cause prices to go upward. I'd say there is practically no opportunity except here and there in some rather limited circumstances.

Mr. Stone: That is, up to the present time a considerable part of the wage increases (i.e., increases in rates per hour, which have

been something less than 10 per cent on the average) have not had a very substantial effect in raising costs and pushing prices up, because we were working up toward capacity in a good many instances?

MR. YNTEMA: I wouldn't agree with that completely.

MR. LESCOHIER: Substantially, Stone's right.

MR. STONE: At any rate, it has been a factor. But, from now on, any increase in wages will operate to increase costs and push prices up.

MR. YNTEMA: The past increases in wages will also tend to push prices up. I don't want to argue the point in detail. I think we are in substantial agreement.

MR. STONE: I think we ought to distinguish between the effect of wages on cost and that relation to prices and the general pulling-up effect that comes from an enormous increase in the total wage bill of the nation, bidding for reduced quantities of goods.

MR. YNTEMA: Stone, suppose you were on the War Labor Board. Could you summarize, briefly, what your recommendations would be for proper wage policy in wartime?

MR. STONE: That's a very difficult thing to say. I think it would be unwise to impose an absolutely rigid ceiling—that is, to absolutely freeze all wage rates as of a given moment.

But, in general, the War Labor Board policy should be against any increase in wages, either in high-wage industries or in low-wage industries, if it can be avoided without doing severe injustice.

MR. LESCOHIER: I wouldn't go that far. I think that there are many industries and occupations in which wages should be raised substantially in 1942 to bring them into balance with the rest of the economic situation. However, a good many of the workers in the low-wage industries are going to leave them to go into the high-

wage industries. One of the important causes of wage increases in recent months has been employers' bidding for labor. In other words, "attraction" wages are being offered by many industries to get workers.

MR. STONE: As a matter of policy, that should be discouraged and even forbidden in so far as it could be enforced.

MR. YNTEMA: I think you gentlemen are both agreed that the pre-war policy to work for higher and higher wage rates is now not appropriate—that our national policy ought now to be to keep wage rates from rising as part of a more general policy of keeping all prices from rising.

MR. STONE: And, specifically, I would go farther. If we are to have any policy that means anything on wages, wage rates should not be increased in any working situation unless there is overpowering evidence in support of it in the interest of justice.

MR. LESCOHIER: Canada has adopted a policy of freezing wages on a certain base date and then permitting increases in wages only on the basis of actual changes in the cost of living, with the provision that by government permission readjustments may be made in particular industries where there is believed to be an unjust situation, such as Stone suggested.

MR. YNTEMA: I'd like to pass on to the question of appropriate hours. In the polls we find that the public thinks that there ought to be a maximum of some sixty hours; that laborers ought to be working a sixty-hour week. What do you think of that?[4]

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[4] *Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins announced a policy, approved by the War and Navy departments, for relaxation of state labor laws and regulations in regard to the work week. Senator Reed (Rep., Kansas) has introduced a bill to increase from 40 to 48 hours the work week that can be paid for at straight time under the Wages and Hours Law. This law now requires payment of time and one-half for all hours worked over 40.*

TREND OF STRIKES: 1941



EACH SYMBOL= 100 STRIKES | EACH SYMBOL= 100,000 WORKERS | EACH SYMBOL= 1,000,000 MAN-DAYS

SOURCE: BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

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Mr. Lescohier: That is another evidence of the lack of understanding on the part of the public of what is possible in modern industries. England has checked carefully, both in the preceding war and in this war, and has found that sixty-hour weeks simply result, after a few months, in a decrease in man-hour production. We are working more than forty hours a week, and we'll have to work more than forty hours a week; but probably forty-eight to fifty-two hours a week represents the maximum which people can stand under modern conditions.

Mr. Stone: I agree with that, but I do think we ought to put in our law the provision that no overtime will be paid until after forty-eight hours a week, because that tends to bid up wages very quickly and very sharply as hours increase.

Mr. Lescohier: I think that for the duration of the war the principle that overtime must be paid for all work done in excess of forty hours a week should be set to one side. I think we might work straight time up to forty-eight hours and then charge double time in order to try to keep the actual working week as close as possible to forty-eight hours as a physical maximum.

Mr. Stone: We also have the very important question of the extension of union organization, the stabilization of union organization, through the closed shop, and issues related to it.

Mr. Yntema: I have noticed that most people don't know what the closed shop means. Will you spell it out?

Mr. Stone: There are a good many varieties of things that are called a closed shop.

Now, the most basic one of all, I suspect, is what is called the "union shop." That is a shop in which a man must join a union if he is to continue in employment in that place. The employer may hire nonunion men, but after a time the men must join a union to continue in employment.

Now, the closed shop would be a little different from that; it would be a situation in which only a union member could be employed in the first place. There are some other variations. Do you think they are important, Lescohier?

MR. LESCOHIER: I think the important thing is that we draw a distinction between the closed shop and the union shop. In a closed-shop situation you must be a member of the union before you can be hired. In a union shop you may have to join the union after you are hired, but the employer can hire in the market whatever people he believes are good prospects as employees.

MR. STONE: Of course, that's a distinction that sometimes makes no difference. If a union refuses to admit to membership the people that the employer hires, then, in effect, the union shop becomes a closed shop.

MR. YNTEMA: I think you have disposed of the definition. I'd like to put the real issue to you in two questions. First, in your opinion would it be a long-run, desirable public policy to encourage the extension of the closed shop; and, second, do you think that at the present time there should be any encouragement to the extension of the closed shop?

MR. STONE: Well, if I answer your first question in accordance with my convictions, it may take away some of the convincing character of my answer to your second, because as a long-run matter I can consider it to be contrary to sound social policy to encourage, promote, and protect the closed shop.

MR. YNTEMA: I agree with you.

MR. STONE: It is essentially, as I see it, a monopolistic arrangement which we should not sponsor.

MR. LESCOHIER: I disagree with both of you.

MR. STONE: All right. We are clear on that as a matter of social policy.

Mr. Lescohier: But let me state my reason. A closed shop has two purposes. One is to give security, to prevent the employer from hiring nonunion men and gradually replacing the union men with nonunion men or with men of a rival union. The other purpose is that the men who pay the dues and bear all the burdens of the union and get wages and other advantages for the employees of the establishment hate to pay the bills and have somebody else get the benefits.

Mr. Stone: Let them persuade them to join the union, then. This is a free country. It ought to be free. We say it is.

Mr. Lescohier: Why don't we do that in the field of taxation? You and I want the other fellow to pay his taxes, and we compel him to.

Mr. Stone: The analogy has no bearing.

Mr. Yntema: We'd be here all day if we tried to argue this out. I don't think we are going to get any meeting of minds on it.

But I'd like to raise the second question again, if I may. That is, recognizing our fundamental differences with respect to long-run policy, what is proper wartime policy with respect to the closed shop?

Mr. Stone: I would say that we can't, at this time, repeal the rights that organized labor has under the Wagner Act. They have been given the right to organize and bargain collectively with the employers. We can't take away that right.

I think that, to get on with the war and further the national interest in every possible way, we should have a moratorium on any open struggles about the promotion and extension of unionism, closed shop, and other issues. That will require employers to agree to do nothing to undermine unions and to permit the national War Labor Board to adjudicate such questions. It also means that the unions do the same thing.


MAJOR STRIKE ISSUES
During the First Six Months of 1941
Wages and Hours
Union Organization
Other Causes
Strikes
Workers Involved
EACH COMPLETE SYMBOL EQUALS 10 PER CENT
SOURCE: BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
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MR. LESCOHIER: It means that the government will have to protect absolutely the security of unions. Management not only will have to agree but will have to carry out its agreement not to take advantage of such a moratorium to undermine unions.

About four million of the eleven million union workmen in this country are in closed-shop agreements, and there are a good many more in closed shops in fact that are not covered by closed-shop agreements. That will have to be respected.

MR. YNTEMA: What you two are saying is that there ought to be a truce with respect to this struggle for union organization, with protection of the status quo, both for the present unions and for the management.

MR. STONE: I agree to that.

Now, there is the question of union participation in industry management during the war period. The unions have been very pressing about that matter, and I think it will give rise to difficulties if it isn't thought through clearly and a definite understanding established.

MR. YNTEMA: I would like to distinguish two situations, because I think they call for different kinds of treatment. One is the

matter of union participation in formation of policy where it acts as an adviser, just as management would be called and act as an adviser with respect to general policy in some situation.

The other is the case where the man has an administrative role in the government. In the first case, a labor leader can act as an adviser without stepping out of his role as labor leader. In the second place, when the labor leader takes an administrative position in the government, he has to stop being a labor leader, just as a businessman has to stop being a businessman. He has to be a public servant.

MR. STONE: I agree.

In connection with labor's acting in an advisory capacity, there is a program on foot to establish a number of industry councils, which I think is all to the good, to give organized labor a chance to participate in an effective way in working out general policies.

MR. LESCOHIER: There are two ways in which a government can run a modern war. One is to suppress the rights and participations of the private citizens and have everything controlled by the government, as they do in Germany. The other way is for the government to call into actual councils management, labor, and whatever group of citizens are vitally affected by a policy. That is what they have done in England. The English war policy was not effective until they brought labor into the councils of the government. I think that is an impending step in this country and a necessary one.

MR. STONE: I think that's a very important matter, and I'm all in favor of your position on that; but I don't think that that will satisfy organized labor. Murray has what he calls the "Murray Plan." That plan would set up an organization composed of trade-union officials and business managers who would not just give advice about the war policies of the industry but would, in fact, operate and control all the essential features of the industry—establish a real cartel form of government.

MR. YNTEMA: Wouldn't you object to that because of its long-run effects on establishing monopoly in the future?

MR. STONE: I would say that that is one of the things, irrespective of what it implies for the future, which ought to be stopped right now. There is no place for that.

MR. YNTEMA: I'd like to raise one other question, if I may, that we mentioned earlier, and that is the question of strikes. The public in general thinks that strikes in war industries ought to be prohibited by law. Would you agree with that attitude, Stone?

MR. STONE: No. I don't see how we can get anywhere by prohibiting strikes by law. That gets us nowhere.

MR. LESCOHIER: It can't be done. We have much more promise of effective results through the steps that the government is now taking whereby, through conferences between the President and the leaders of the great labor unions and of management, they are setting up a situation where management and labor are, themselves, taking the responsibility of doing away with strikes. Of course, we can't do away with them, but we should reduce them.

MR. STONE: In addition to the high officials in the two labor organizations agreeing to a no-strike policy, it ought to be the understanding of every workman in every local union throughout the United States, and in the mind of every manager throughout the United States, that they are going to settle these difficulties without stoppage of work.

MR. LESCOHIER: The new War Labor Board is in a strategic position to resolve the difficulties that come up between management and labor. An unusually large number of labor disputes started in December and January.[5] They are going into the hands of the War Labor Board instead of developing into strikes.

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[5] *The United States Conciliation Service reported at the end of January that it was carrying the heaviest case load in its history. Its list of 733 cases was growing as new disputes were reported at an accelerated rate.*

Mr. Yntema: I think it's our consensus here that, first of all, our major objective is production for a maximum war effort; second, that we need a labor policy which is understood generally in order to achieve that end; and, finally, that we need a truce between management and labor with respect to the issues which have beset them. That is, we need in this situation, all of us, to pitch in and to sacrifice in order to do our best to win the war.

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES CONCERNED WITH MAINTAINING INDUSTRIAL PEACE

Frequent reference is made to various government agencies that may be unfamiliar to the layman. A brief identification follows:

United States Conciliation Service. A division of the Department of Labor, consisting of 110 conciliators, directed by Dr. John R. Steelman, who work with management and labor to solve disputes.

Labor Policy Advisory Committee. A group of sixteen labor-organization men (A.F. of L., C.I.O., and Railway Brotherhoods) attached to Sidney Hillman's labor division in the Office of Production Management. Their function is purely advisory.

Labor and Industrial Consultants. Another OPM group of fourteen labor men and fifteen industrialists, some of them dollar-a-year men, who work behind the scenes to persuade stubborn employers or labor leaders to accept mediation.

National Labor Relations Board. A three-man board administering the Wagner Act. Its chief duties are to prevent unfair labor practices in industry, to enforce the right of collective bargaining, and to supervise elections. Its members often act as unofficial mediators.

War Labor Board. Consisting of twenty men charged with the final settlement of all labor disputes for the duration, the War Labor Board replaces the Defense Mediation Board. In setting up the new board, the President stipulated the procedures to be followed: Direct negotiations between management and union; if that fails, notification of the United States Conciliation Service, with a federal conciliator given an opportunity to settle the dispute; if the dispute still is not settled, the Secretary of Labor would refer it to the War Labor Board, or that agency might take over the case on its own motion. Once the dispute has reached the Board, it must be settled—by persuasion if possible, but by decision if necessary.

TYPES OF UNION STATUS

A recent Twentieth Century Fund survey reports that union status takes one or more of the following forms:

Closed Shop. Only union members can be hired, and workers must remain union members to retain employment.

Union Shop. Nonmembers may be hired but, to retain employment, must become union members after a certain period.

Preferential Shop. Union members are given preference in hiring or layoff, or both.

Maintenance of Membership Shop. No one is forced to join union, but all present or future members must remain in good standing as a condition of employment.

Exclusive Bargaining Shop. The union is recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent for all employees, whether union members or not.

Bargaining for Members Only. The union is recognized as the bargaining agent for its own members only.

SUGGESTED READINGS

CARSKADON, T. R., *Labor in the Defense Crisis.* "Public Affairs Pamphlet," No. 58. New York, 1941. *A review of the labor problem based on a Twentieth Century Fund survey.*

DE WILDE, JOHN C., *Defense Economy of the United States: Labor Problems.* "Foreign Policy Reports," September 15, 1941. *A factual statement of the labor situation in 1941.*

GREGORY, C. O.; YNTEMA, T. O.; and the ROVING REPORTER, *Labor's Responsibility in Defense.* A University of Chicago ROUND TABLE transcript, No. 194, November 30, 1941.

HARD, WILLIAM, "Should Labor Have Glass Pockets?" *Reader's Digest,* January, 1942. *Argues for a re-thinking of the labor problem.*

"Labor Shortage Ahead as War Industry Grows," *United States News,* February 6, 1942. *Tells how growth of the army and war industry will affect our labor supply.*

"Manning the Arsenal for Democracy," *Survey Graphic* ("Calling America Series," No. 5), November, 1941. *This special edition contains a great deal of material on current industrial relations.*

"No Strikes, No Lockouts," *United States News,* January 2, 1942. *A comparison of our present wartime labor policy with that of the first World War.*

REYNOLDS, LLOYD G., *Labor and National Defense.* New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1941. *Predicts that union rivalry, rising prices, and larger profits may result in more strikes, and discounts the idea that legal prohibition of strikes is the solution.*

"Rise in Worker Disputes," *United States News*, February 6, 1942. *Higher living costs and production speedups are the chief causes of a great increase in the number of disputes before the War Labor Board.*

ROBEY, RALPH, "The Reuther Plan," *Newsweek*, January 26, 1942. *Critique of the plan as one which offers nothing that would result in greater production.*

SLICHTER, SUMNER H., *Economic Factors Affecting Industrial Relations Policy in National Defense.* New York: Industrial Relations Counselors, 1941. *An eminent authority analyzes union economic policy and its effect on our economy.*

———, "Labor and the War," *Atlantic Monthly*, May, 1941. *A factual consideration of what would be the best economic policy for insuring maximum production.*

STRAIGHT, MICHAEL, "The Automobile Conference," *New Republic* January 19, 1942. *A critical article on management's cooperation in the defense program.*

"Survey," *Fortune*, February, 1942. *Public-opinion-poll material on public attitudes and knowledge about labor problems.*

OBJECTIVE QUESTIONS FOR EXAMINATION

The answers to the following questions may be found in the text of the broadcast, and page references are provided to assist in locating the answers.

*

1. What aspects of labor activity has the public become increasingly critical of? Page 2.
2. What are the major problems of a wartime labor policy? Pages 3–5.
3. How many strikes were there in the United States in 1941? Page 4.
4. What has been the fundamental policy of labor in regard to wages? Page 6.
5. Why is it that the standard of living cannot rise at the present time? Pages 8–9.
6. How great a reduction in the amount of available goods and services for civilians may be expected by the end of 1942? Page 9.
7. How great has been the increase of real wages of factory workers since September, 1939? Page 10.
8. What wage policy has been advocated by the A.F. of L. and C.I.O. leaders? Page 10.
9. What is the Canadian wartime wage policy? Page 12.
10. What is the "union shop"? Page 14.
11. What is the "closed shop"? Page 15.
12. How many million union workmen are part of closed-shop agreements? Page 17.

QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The following questions of wider scope, intended for discussion, are suggested by the broadcast, and answers may be found in the literature on the subject listed in the section "Suggested Readings," found on pages 23–24.

*

1. Discuss the relation between wages, prices, and inflation. Should labor seek to improve its wages in wartime?

2. Discuss Canada's "cost-of-living bonus" wage policy. Do you think a ceiling should be put on wages? Should wages be frozen at the present (or recent) level?

3. Why does labor wish to extend the closed shop? What are the merits of the closed shop? Should labor unions have the right to demand the closed shop in wartime? Should Congress freeze the situation as of now?

4. Is the success of the War Labor Board and the National Labor Relations Board such that we are securing the maximum of co-operation from labor? Is labor working an appropriate number of hours? Are strikes at a minimum? How well has labor kept its pledge not to strike?

5. Does labor have real representation in the policy and the management of the defense production program? Should the Philip Murray plan of industrial councils be adopted to give labor more policy and management functions?

6. What recommendations would you make for the improvement of wartime labor policy? What should be the objectives of our labor policy? How best can the full support of labor for the war effort be secured?

The Listeners' Round Table . . . .

Letters to the ROUND TABLE *frequently contain interesting and illuminating side lights on the subject matter discussed on the air. These comments are from letters received following the broadcast-discussion of "Are We Overconfident?" February 1, 1942.*

*

Congratulations

The ROUND TABLE is one of the high lights of the week for me, for it helps me keep informed on the major issues of discussion of the day.

Congratulations for your wonderful record of eleven years of informative, thought-stirring programs. I trust that our way of life will always be such that your program may be presented, so that all views (even if they are not the popular ones of the moment or the views set forth by the wishful thinkers and indorsed by all) may be heard.

Sergeant K. G. K., New York

*

13,000,000

Total war is an all-out affair. We hear so much about "all out" and about "unity" and "democracy," and at the same time we deny 13,000,000 black Americans the right to enlist and serve in all branches of the armed forces.

The United States is a large place. We have much to do, and it will require the best in every last one of our 130,000,000 citizens, white and black, to do the job.

It is unthinkable that any American should be willing to sacrifice this country and all that he possesses rather than fight side by side with his colored fellow-Americans.

This is out-Hitlerizing Hitler, who, in spite of his boasted Aryanism, was mighty glad to accept the assistance of the Japanese.

C. R. B., Pennsylvania

*

On the Alert

Praise! For the average man your program is the best "on the alert" America could ever have.

Congratulations on your eleventh anniversary.

J. J. O'D., Pennsylvania

*

Rank and File

You pointed out very clearly our shortcomings, but no one yet has dared come right out and show what our situation will be if we lose this

WHAT SHOULD THE CHURCHES DO IN WAR?

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A UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE BROADCAST

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FEBRUARY 15, 1942

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ERNEST C. COLWELL, Dean of the Divinity School, University of Chicago

CHARLES CLAYTON MORRISON, Editor, *The Christian Century*

ROBERT REDFIELD, Dean of the Division of the Social Sciences, University of Chicago

[PRINTED IN U.S.A.]